Mrs. Frydenlund holds a law degree from the University of Oslo and North Dakota. Her experience includes working for Huawei Technologies, Aker Engineering & Technologies (Aker Solutions) and Nexans Norway. Mrs. Frydenlund joined Nordic in 2018, and also acts as Secretary to the Board of Directors and Risk Manager for the Executive Management Team.. Marianne Frydenlund is based in Oslo, Norway.
Mattia Fogliacco is President of Sisvel Group. Mr. Fogliacco focuses on makings sure Sisvel maintains its leadership in the creation of value through licensing activities, simplifying access to patented technologies and reducing the friction in clearing licensing transactions by creating efficient forms of intermediation in complex licensing environments.
Taraneh Maghamé is vice president of wireless programs and corporate development at Via Licensing Corp., a subsidiary of US audio pioneer Dolby Laboratories. Ms Maghamé develops and manages strategic multi-party licensing programs in wireless and cellular technologies, including the LTE/LTE-Advanced and W-CDMA patent pools.
Innovators invest large sums creating technologies that are ultimately adopted as standards; technology implementers build upon. Not surprisingly, innovators want to be paid. Equally unsurprising, implementers want to pay less than innovators seek to charge. Both are necessary to have a complete and thriving ecosystem. This panel will discuss the current state of the SEP ecosystem at large, internationally. Can implementers and innovators co-exist and get along without litigation?
Patent pools are simply an agreement between two or more patent owners to license their patents, or a subset of a particular portfolio, to third parties. Often, patent pools are associated with complex technologies that require numerous complementary patents in order to provide efficient technical solutions, such as in the standard essential patent (SEP) space. Patent pools have been the subject of both legal and an economic debate over the years, sometimes in vogue and other times challenged by regulators.
The next industrial revolution will not only impact the smartphone and computer industries, but will spread to many more industrial verticals. The Internet of Things is among the industries most likely to be impacted by the next wave. While licensing SEPs in the telecom industry is well understood, licensing SEPs will be more difficult outside of the smartphone industry. With fundamental disagreements about where in the supply chain licenses should be taken.
Nowhere in the IP world is ADR more appropriate than for SEPs. For those parties wanting to conclude a FRAND licensing agreement without the uncertainty of lengthy, contentious, and unpredictable SEP litigation, ADR provides a tailored scope of dispute, choice of law options, confidentiality, international enforceability of arbitration awards and leeway to structure the procedure, not to mention the availability of mediators and arbitrators who are experts in the law and substance of the dispute.
What is the meaning of fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory? The terms are easy to say, but difficult to parse. Even more difficult when licensees refuse to engage patent owners in good faith negotiations. Do licensees who refuse to enter into good faith negotiations forfeit FRAND? Should they? Furthermore, the idea of FRAND being a limit on patent damages raises numerous sub-questions. Can entitlement to FRAND be lost, for example where the licensee is unwilling? If so, can entitlement to FRAND be regained?
Standard Essential Patents are at issue in various U.S. forums, from district courts, to the International Trade Commission, to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, and ultimately all the way to the Federal Circuit. Few issues are as hotly litigated as the question about an entitlement to an injunction. Innovators believe injunctions and exclusion orders are absolutely necessary. Not surprising, technology implementers have a different viewpoint altogether on the appropriateness of injunctive relief.
Most market experts predict dramatic changes for the auto industry. The sector will likely be heavily affected by new sustainability and environmental policy changes, as well as by upcoming regulations on security issues. These forces will give rise to disruptive technology trends, such as driverless vehicles, electrification and interconnectivity. This will require the integration of highly patented standardized technologies, thereby creating economic risks and uncertainty for vehicle manufacturers.
Consistent with the New Madison Approach, the Trump Administration Antitrust Division took a number of initiatives aimed at reducing perceived new antitrust risks associated with widely employed patent licensing practices (particularly those touching on standardization). The Delrahim Antitrust Division from 2017 through 2020 filed more than 40 amicus briefs or statements of interest in antitrust cases. It amassed a respectable box score: courts accepted the Department’s position in 15 cases and disagreed in two cases.
One of the major challenges when licensing, transacting, or managing Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) is that there is no public database that provides information about verified SEPs. Standard-setting organizations (SSOs) such as ETSI (4G / 5G) maintain databases of self-declared patents, which are disclosed as potentially being relevant to the standard under consideration, and as a result become “standard essential patents” through self declaration whether the standard ultimately reads on the patents or not. As a result, which patents are actually essential and which are not is one of the most hotly debated when negotiating SEP portfolio value, royalties, or infringement claims. Against this backdrop, how should SEP portfolios be built?